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courts have been unable to find even one cut and dried way to analyze the issue.
Instead, the cases directly on point have resulted in at least three doctrinal
approaches to resolving the question.1 The first approach is what this author calls the
“congressional intent” analysis.2 The next approach is what this author calls the “sex
stereotyping” analysis.3 Lastly, there is the “plain meaning” analysis.4 Not only are
courts inconsistent in how they analyze these cases, but courts are also inconsistent
in reaching conclusions under certain consistent approaches.5 The purpose of this
Article is two-fold. First, this Article will discuss whether transsexuals should be
protected at all from employment discrimination, and if so, whether protection
should be accomplished through legislative or judicial means. Then, the Article will
discuss each of the aforementioned approaches and advocate for a logical and
consistent manner in which courts should decide cases under Title VII where a
transsexual plaintiff alleges discrimination because of sex.
Part I discusses both the factual and legal distinctions between “transsexuals,”
“transgendered,” and “inter-sexed” individuals. Part II discusses various legislative
approaches to protection of transsexuals and other transgendered individuals. Part
III discusses the ramifications of holding that Title VII protects transsexuals from
employment discrimination and concludes that federal law should protect
transsexuals from employment discrimination. Part IV discusses the “congressional
intent” approach and concludes that courts should abandon the use of this approach
in the context of deciding whether Title VII protects transsexuals. Part V discusses
the “sex stereotyping” approach and concludes that this approach is not well-suited
for deciding whether transsexuals are members of a “protected class” under Title
VII. Part VI discusses the “plain meaning” approach and concludes that this
approach is the most appropriate way to resolve whether Title VII protects
transsexuals. The conclusion advocates for the use of the “plain meaning” approach
in analyzing cases involving transsexuals.
II. WHO ARE TRANSSEXUALS AND HOW DO THEY DIFFER FROM OTHER
TRANSGENDERED INDIVIDUALS?
No federal court has espoused a legal definition of the word “transsexual” in
anything but dicta.6 The medical profession defines transsexuals as individuals who
“[experience] great discomfort regarding their actual anatomic gender” and “who are
committed to altering their physical appearance through cosmetics, hormones, and,
1

See, e.g., Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005); Ulane v. E.
Airlines, Inc. 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984); Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203
(D.D.C. 2006).
2

See, e.g., Ulane, 742 F.2d 1081.

3

See, e.g., Barnes, 401 F.3d 729.

4

See, e.g., Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203.

5
Compare id., at 212 (holding that transsexuals are protected by Title VII under a “plain
meaning” analysis), with Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir. 2007)
(holding that transsexuals are not protected by Title VII under a “plain meaning” analysis).
6
See, e.g., Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1083 n.3 (defining “transsexualism” as “a condition that
exists when a physiologically normal person . . . experiences discomfort or discontent about
nature’s choice of his or her particular sex and prefers to be the other sex”).
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in some cases, surgery.”7 Transsexuals do not identify themselves as being members
of the sex that they were assigned at birth,8 whereas transvestites are content with the
sex they were assigned at birth, but dress as people of the opposite sex for sexual
arousal.9 One study, however, reveals that the distinction between transsexuals and
transvestites is not so clear.10 The study notes that, “trans people have complex
gender identities, often moving from one ‘trans’ category into another over time.”11
The term “transgendered” is used as an umbrella term to describe anybody whose
dress and/or behavior can be interpreted as transgressing gender roles.12 This
includes transsexuals, transvestites, and other categories of people whose dress
and/or behavior do not conform to gender roles.13
Intersexed individuals, on the other hand, are not necessarily transgendered
people. Intersexed individuals are a category of people whose sex at birth is
ambiguous for one of two reasons: (1) the sexual organ can be classified as either an
abnormally small penis or a large clitoris;14 or (2) they are chromosomally of one sex
but they develop genetalia of the opposite sex because of a genetic mutation.15
Intersexed individuals may also have gender identity issues, thereby making them
transgendered as well.16 However, the two categories are separate and distinct.17
This Article will not further discuss issues involving intersexed individuals.
Interestingly, the medical profession uses the term “transsexualism” as an
informal synonym for “gender identity disorder” or GID.18 The standard medical
procedure for treating GID is referred to as “triadic therapy,” and it consists of: (1)
7
WebMD, Gender Identity Disorder, http://www.webmd.com/sex/gender-identitydisorder (last visited Sept. 5, 2009).
8

See id.

9

Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1083 n.3.

10

See STEPHEN WHITTLE, LEWIS TURNER & MARYAM AL-ALAMI, EQUALITIES REVIEW,
ENGENDERED PENALTIES: TRANSGENDERED AND TRANSSEXUAL PEOPLE’S EXPERIENCES OF
INEQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION 14 (2007), http://www.pfc.org.uk/files/Engendered
Penalties.pdf.
11

Id.

12

See Richard Ekins & Dave King, Blending Genders: Contributions to the Emerging
Field of Transgender Studies, 1 INT’L J. TRANSGENDERISM 1, 1 (1997), available at
http://www.symposion.com/ijt/ijtc0101.htm.
13

See id.

14

See Jennifer Rellis, “Please Write ‘E’ in This Box” Toward Self-Identification and
Recognition of a Third Gender: Approaches in the United States and India, 14 MICH. J
GENDER & L. 223, 226 (2008).
15

See id.; see also, NAT’L ORG. FOR RARE DISORDERS, INC., REPORT: ANDROGEN
INSENSITIVITY SYNDROME, PARTIAL (2005), available at http://www.webmd.com/sexualconditions/androgen-insensitivity-syndrome-partial.
16

See Rellis, supra note 14, at 226-27.

17

See id.

18

See The Harry Benjamin Int’l Gender Dysphoria Ass’n, Standards of Care for Gender
Identity Disorders, (6th ed. 2001) at 2, http://www.wpath.org/Documents2/socv6.pdf.
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real-life experience living as a person of the self-identified sex; (2) hormone therapy;
and (3) surgery to change genitalia and other sex characteristics.19 This protocol of
medical treatment for transsexuals is malleable, however, and according to the
medical profession, not all people with GID “need or want all three elements of
triadic therapy.”20
In order to state a claim as a “transsexual” under Title VII, courts seem to require
more than a mere diagnosis of “gender identity disorder.”21 In fact, in every reported
Title VII case involving a transsexual plaintiff, the plaintiff not only had GID, but
also underwent (or sought to undergo) sex reassignment surgery.22 Also, in many
cases, the court required substantial medical evidence regarding GID.23
III. LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES TO THE PROTECTION OF TRANSSEXUALS AND OTHER
TRANSGENDERED INDIVIDUALS
Numerous states, counties, and municipalities have enacted legislation that either
explicitly declares that employment discrimination on the basis of “gender identity”
is forbidden,24 or that protects transsexuals and other transgendered individuals under
a prohibition of discrimination because of “sex”25 or because of “sexual
orientation.”26 Other state law protected classes that include transsexuals are
“gender,” “transgender status,” and “affectional preference.”27 All in all, thirteen
states, the District of Columbia, and 108 localities have enacted legislation explicitly
protecting transsexuals and other transgendered individuals from employment

19

Id. at 3.

20

Id.

21

See, e.g., Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 213 (D.D.C. 2006) (requiring the
plaintiff to develop a more thorough factual record that “reflects the scientific basis of sexual
identity in general, and gender dysphoria in particular”). For an argument that legal
protections of transgender people are too narrow because courts tend only to protect plaintiffs
who have had or seek to have sex reassignment surgery and, even in such cases, make it
overly burdensome for the plaintiff to prove a case by requiring a plethora of medical
evidence, see Dylan Vade, Expanding Gender and Expanding the Law: Toward a Social and
Legal Conceptualization of Gender that is More Inclusive of Transgender People, 11 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 253, 271-73 (2005).
22

See, e.g., Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 213.

23

See, e.g., id.

24
See, e.g., N.M. STAT. § 28-1-7(A) (2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7(1)(I) (2007); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 10-5-12(a) (West 2007).
25

See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12926(p) (West 2007); CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.56(c)
(West 2009).
26

See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 363A.08(2) (2007); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/1-103(O-1)
(2008).
27
For a complete list of all the states, counties, and municipalities that have legislation
explicitly protecting transsexuals from employment discrimination and other forms of
discrimination, see Transgender Law and Policy Ins., Scope of Explicitly TransgenderInclusive Anti-Discrimination Laws, http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/fact
_sheets/TI_antidisc_laws_7_08.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2009).
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discrimination.28 Still other states, counties, and municipalities have enacted
legislation or executive orders that protect transsexuals and other transgendered
individuals who are public employees from employment discrimination.29
What explains this trend towards legislative protection of transsexuals and other
transgendered individuals from employment discrimination? The answer lies in the
rationale behind anti-discrimination laws in general. The goal of employment
discrimination law in general is to achieve equal employment opportunities for
everybody.30 The law seeks to have employment decisions based solely on merit
(i.e., the quality of an individual’s work performance), rather than on immutable
characteristics such as race, skin color, sex, disability, age, etcetera.31 Some of the
criticism surrounding the protection of transsexuals from workplace discrimination is
based on an unfortunately common misconception that transsexualism is a choice
and therefore not an immutable characteristic deserving protected class status.32
However, various medical studies “suggest that [transsexualism] may be caused by
genetic (chromosomal) abnormalities, hormone imbalances during fetal and
childhood development, defects in normal human bonding and child rearing, or a
combination of these factors,”33 meaning that transsexualism is immutable.34 After
all, why would anybody voluntarily subject themselves to all the negative
consequences that transsexuals often face, such as high unemployment, low wages,
homelessness, lack of health care, and criminal victimization?35
IV. SO WHAT IF TRANSSEXUALS ARE PROTECTED UNDER TITLE VII?
Generally, Title VII represents a legislative compromise between the sometimes
adverse interests of employers and employees.36 This section seeks to compile the
28

See id. at 4.

29

See id. at 5.

30

See Julie C. Suk, Discrimination at Will: Job Security Protections and Equal
Employment Opportunity in Conflict, 60 STAN. L. REV. 73, 77 (2007).
31

See Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination
Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1, 8, 13, 19-20 (2000).
32

For example, in a conversation I had with a fellow student about this article, the student
argued that transgendered people do not deserve protection from employment discrimination
because one chooses to be transgendered.
33

WebMD, supra note 7.

34

See Hazel Glenn Beh, Sex, Sexual Pleasure, and Reproduction: Health Insurers Don’t
Want You to Do Those Nasty Things, 13 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 119, 150 (1998).
35

For statistical data regarding income, health insurance, housing, employment, and abuse
rates for transgendered people, see S.F. Dep’t of Pub. Health, The Transgender Community
Health Project (1999), available at http://www.transgenderlaw.org/resources/transfact
sheet.pdf.
36
See generally, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) (referring to a
“balance between employee rights and employer prerogatives”), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991 § 107, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071; McDaniel v. Essex Int’l, Inc.,
571 F.2d 338, 344 (6th Cir. 1978) (“In enacting section 701(j) Congress explicitly required a
balancing between the religious needs of the individual and the legitimate business needs of an
employer.”).
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available empirical data regarding unemployment rates of, wage rates of,
discrimination rates against, and harassment rates against transsexuals and other
transgendered people (representing the interests of employees), along with economic
studies regarding workplace efficiency (representing the interests of employers), and
balance the pros and cons of holding that transsexuals are protected under Title VII.
While the author concludes that it is in the best interests of society to protect
transsexuals under federal law, the author urges the reader to reach his or her own
conclusions based on the information available.
This section also addresses whether a legislative or judicial approach is better
suited to protect transsexuals from employment discrimination. The author
concludes that a legislative approach is most appropriate, but any protection will do.
Lastly, this section discusses the more difficult question of whether antidiscrimination law can adequately protect the interests of transsexuals. The author’s
conclusion on this point is skeptical, but hopeful.
Transsexual employees merely seek equal employment opportunities and equal
protection under the law.37 Yet, the available evidence shows a lack of equality for
transsexuals in the workplace. About one in every 18,000 to one in every 30,000
people are male to female (MTF) transsexuals.38 About one in every 54,000 to one
in every 100,000 people are female to male (FTM) transsexuals.39 Not much
empirical work has been done in the area of employment of transsexuals; however,
“available studies provide strong evidence that ‘harassment and other forms of
discrimination in the workplace, from recruitment to promotion, is endemic when it
comes to transsexual people.’”40 In one survey, 37% of transsexuals said that they
had been demoted or fired for being transsexual.41 Another study found a 42%
unemployment rate for transsexuals.42 In 1999, the median monthly income for
transsexuals in San Francisco was $744 for MTF transsexuals and $1,100 for FTM
transsexuals.43 In the United Kingdom, where transsexuals are protected from
employment discrimination, 22% of transsexuals, after completing sex reassignment
surgery, reported that their employers forced them to use the bathroom for people of
their sex assigned at birth.44 Thrity-eight percent of transsexuals in the United
Kingdom reported experiencing harassment at work near the time of sex
reassignment surgery, while 6% of transsexuals reported physical abuse at work.45
37

See generally, Vade, supra note 21.

38

See JSI Research and Training Inst., Inc., Access to Health Care for Transgendered
Persons in Greater Boston, at 3 (2000), available at http://www.glbthealth.org/
documents/transaccessstudy.pdf.
39

See id.

40

See WHITTLE, TURNER & AL-ALAMI, supra note 10, at 22 (quoting Stephen Whittle,
Employment Discrimination and Transsexual People, (2000), http://www.pfc.org.uk/files/
Employment.Discrimination_and_Transsexual_People.pdf).
41

See id. at 23.

42

See id.

43

See S.F. Dep’t of Pub. Health, supra note 35.

44

See WHITTLE, TURNER & AL-ALAMI, supra note 10, at 35.

45

Id. at 23.
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Most alarmingly, one study concludes that “[t]he overall socio-economic
discrimination experienced by trans people, as a result of poor pay, job loss or low
income support has been strongly linked with experiencing a transgender-related
violent incident.”46
Therefore, protecting transsexuals from employment
discrimination may not only decrease unemployment and workplace harassment, but
may also reduce the incidence of hate crimes.
Employers, on the other hand, are mainly interested in making money.47 Most
employers, especially those in highly competitive markets, seek to increase profits
either through cutting costs, increasing revenues, or a combination of the two. As for
cutting costs, many law and economics scholars argue that employment decisions are
structured so as to reduce or eliminate transaction costs.48 These scholars conclude
that transaction costs are reduced, and many employers operate most efficiently,
through homogeneity in the workforce.49 In fact, scholar Richard Epstein, argues
that “part of the problem with antidiscrimination law is that it compromises
workplace efficiency by preventing employers from establishing homogeneous
workplace cultures.”50 Other scholars contend that “[n]either antidiscrimination law
nor the affirmative pursuit of diversity operates as a meaningful barrier to, or
substantially undermines the incentives for employers to achieve, workplace
homogeneity,”51 because employers can achieve a diverse, yet homogenous,
workforce by employing only those minority group members who have assimilated
into the mainstream of society.52
In the case of transsexuals and other transgendered people, assimilation is nearly
impossible because of strong American cultural barriers to assimilation.53 If
transsexuals cannot assimilate, then they will be more likely to disrupt workplace
homogeneity, and thus will reduce workplace efficiency.54 Perhaps the best example
supporting the proposition that transsexuals cannot assimilate is the phenomenon of
“transphobia.” Transphobia is the widespread belief that one’s doctor-assigned sex
at birth is one’s true sex and that transgendered people are “frauds against truth, or
people who deceive others,” because their self-identified sex does not conform to the

46

Id.

47

See The Good Company: A Survey of Corporate Social Responsibility, ECONOMIST, Jan.
22, 2005, at 3, available at http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=3555212.
48

See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race
Theory: Crossroads, Directions, and a New Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1788
(2003) (reviewing FRANCISO VALDES, JEROME MCCRISTAL CULP & ANGELA P. HARRIS,
CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (2002)) (“Cumulatively, this
body of work advances a standard economic argument about transaction costs: Employment
decisions will be structured to reduce them.”).
49

See id. at 1789-90, 1793.

50

Id. at 1790.

51

Id. at 1791.

52

See generally id. at 1793 (describing assimilation as “palatability”).

53

See Rellis, supra note 14, at 224.

54

See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 48, at 1789-93.
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doctor-assigned “truth.”55 Nowhere does transphobia manifest itself in the
workplace more than in cases involving a dilemma over which bathroom the
transsexual may use.56 Indeed, numerous employers have legitimate concerns that
workplace productivity and employee morale will suffer because of a controversy
over what bathroom transsexuals use.57 Therefore, protection of transsexuals and
other transgendered people from employment discrimination may be bad for the
economy.
If transsexuals are protected by Title VII, then the employer may be caught in a
“catch 22,” having to choose whether to allow a transsexual to potentially disrupt the
productivity and morale of co-workers by using a certain bathroom, or whether to
discharge the transsexual employee and risk a lawsuit. However, the cases on point
unanimously hold that employers are not liable under Title VII for firing a preoperation transsexual for using the “wrong” bathroom.58 Moreover, it is conceivable
that an employer may avoid liability in such a case through the application of a bonafide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense.59 Although the BFOQ defense is
very narrow,60 at least one court has held that an employer successfully asserted a
BFOQ defense in a case against a female janitor where the job entailed cleaning
mens bathrooms.61 Therefore, it seems logical to extend this defense to employers
who require transsexuals who have yet to officially undergo sexual reassignment
surgery to use the bathroom of the sex assigned at birth.
The benefits of a reduction in unemployment, workplace harassment, and the
incidence of hate crimes far outweigh the increased transaction costs and reduced
workforce efficiency that may result from protecting transsexuals from employment
discrimination. As one venerable attorney once told me, “Slavery is good for the
economy!”62 But that does not justify its legal sanctioning. Additionally, since
transsexuals comprise a relatively minute percentage of the overall population,63 the
potential aggregate economic impact of protecting transsexuals from employment
discrimination should be negligible. More importantly, one need only look at the

55

See Vade, supra note 21, at 287-88.

56

See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1219 (10th Cir. 2007); Johnson
v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 996, 998 (N.D. Ohio 2003).
57

See Johnson, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 998 (referring to “allegations . . . that Plaintiff had been
using both the men’s and women’s restrooms at the meat-packing plant”).
58

See Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1219, 1228; Johnson, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 998, 1000.

59

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2006) (“[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer to hire and employ employees . . . where . . . sex . . . is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular
business or enterprise . . . .”).
60

See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977).

61

See Norwood v. Dale Maint. Sys., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1410, 1423 (N.D. Ill. 1984).

62

This statement was made, in sarcastic criticism of arguments that certain laws are bad
for the economy, by Jeff Boyd, member of the Ohio Association for Justice.
63

JSI Research and Training Inst., Inc., supra note 38, at 3.
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sometimes horrific facts of hate crime cases involving transsexuals to realize that the
law should protect such individuals from discrimination.64
So, what is the best means (i.e., legislative or judicial) to protect transsexuals and
other transgendered people from employment discrimination? Federal legislation is
the most appropriate way to protect transsexuals and other transgendered people
from employment discrimination. This conclusion is based on a combination of
factors such as: (1) the likelihood that Congress will pass legislation protecting
transsexuals from employment discrimination compared to the likelihood that the
Supreme Court will hold that Title VII protects transsexuals; (2) the fact that
legislative protection of transsexuals would be broader and more inclusive of
transgendered people who are not transsexuals than judicial protection under Title
VII; and (3) the unique problems presented by transsexuals in the workplace that
may arise, such as health insurance coverage of sexual reassignment surgery, which
make legislative protection particularly appropriate.
As far as the likelihood that Congress will pass legislation protecting transsexuals
from employment discrimination goes, it probably will not happen anytime soon.
Perhaps the best chance transsexuals have for federal legislative protection from
employment discrimination is inclusion in the proposed Employment NonDiscrimination Act (ENDA).65 ENDA, as it was originally drafted, would have
protected gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transsexual (GLBT) people from discrimination
in employment.66 However, before the House of Representatives voted on the bill,
provisions for “gender identity and expression” were removed from the language of
the bill out of concerns that “including transgender workers in the legislation would
cause it to fail in the full House.”67 The bill, in its amended form, passed through the
House by a vote of 235 to 184.68 Some of the Democratic supporters of the bill in
the House of Representatives voted against it because it did not include protections
for transsexuals.69 Some Republicans also argued that transsexuals should be
included in the legislation, presumably so that the bill would fail.70 Within fortyeight hours of the House’s removal of language that would protect transsexuals from
the bill, GLBT activists united and started a grassroots campaign to pass only the
original version of the bill.71 Most Democratic leaders, however, believe that passing
64
See generally Vade, supra note 21, at 256, 290 n.7 (discussing the beating,
asphyxiation, and murder of a transsexual named Gwen Araujo).
65

See Shannon Price Minter, Banding Together, ADVOCATE.COM Oct. 17, 2007,
http://advocate.com/exclusive_detail_ektid49796.asp (discussing Representative Tammy
Baldwin’s belief that there are sufficient congressional supporters of transsexuals’ rights to
pass a bill that would include a ban on discrimination because of gender identity).
66

See id.

67

See Jesse J. Holland, Bill to Protect GLB Workers Advances Without the T,
ADVOCATE.COM Oct. 19, 2007, http://advocate.com/news_detail_ektid49855.asp.
68

See David M. Herszenhorn, House Approves Broad Protections for Gay Workers, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2007, A1.
69

Holland, supra note 67.

70

See Herszenhorn, supra note 68.

71

See Minter, supra note 65.
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a bill that protects only gay, lesbian, and bisexuals from employment discrimination
“‘will lay the foundation for passing [a bill that would protect transsexuals] in the
future.’”72 Comments such as this, along with the growing trend of enacting
legislation in states and localities around the country, give transsexuals some hope
that one day Congress will protect them from employment discrimination. As of
September 2009, the current status of the bill includes language that would protect
individuals on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.73 However,
considering that some members of Congress have been trying to pass legislation that
would protect homosexuals from employment discrimination for the past thirty-three
years74 and have still failed to do so, it appears that legislative protection of more
politically controversial groups, such as transsexuals and other transgendered people,
may not happen for many years to come.
With the current composition of the Supreme Court, it seems more likely that the
Court will protect transsexuals under Title VII than that Congress will do so. The
deciding vote would be that of Justice Kennedy, since the rest of the Court is split,
with four generally conservative members (Scalia, Alito, Thomas, and Roberts) and
four generally liberal members (Stevens, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor). In
Lawrence v. Texas, a 2003 case holding that it is unconstitutional to criminalize
homosexuality, Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion.75 Although holding that
Title VII protects transsexuals has very little to do with holding that it is
unconstitutional to criminalize homosexuality, the Lawrence opinion, at a bare
minimum, shows that Justice Kennedy is somewhat sympathetic to the plight of
gays, and presumably, to that of transsexuals as well. This means that the best shot
transsexuals have for federal protection from employment discrimination is through
judicial means. However, it is still a long shot given the fact that Justice Kennedy
also joined in the majority opinion of Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, holding that, to
the extent that a New Jersey law prohibited the Boy Scouts from discriminating
against homosexuals in their membership, the law was unconstitutional because it
violated the Boy Scouts’ First Amendment freedom of association.76
Legislative protection of transsexuals would likely be broader and more inclusive
of other transgendered people than judicial protection under Title VII. While Title
VII certainly can be interpreted as protecting transsexuals from employment
discrimination,77 it would be improper for a court to make “transsexual” into a
separate and independent protected class under Title VII without a legislative
amendment to the statute.78 Therefore, in all cases under Title VII involving
transsexuals, the proper inquiry would still be whether the plaintiff was
discriminated against because of sex. As such, it would remain a question of fact for
72

See Holland, supra note 67 (quoting California Democrat George Miller).

73

See HRC, Employment Non-Discrimination Act, http://www.hrc.org/laws_and
_elections/enda.asp (last visited Sept. 17, 2009).
74

See Herszenhorn, supra note 68.

75

See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).

76

See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000).

77

See, e.g., Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D.D.C. 2006).

78

See Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir. 2007).
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the jury to determine whether the transsexual plaintiff in any given case was
discriminated against because of sex.79 The jury would have to decide whether the
employer discriminated against the transsexual plaintiff because the plaintiff changed
from one sex to another sex (presumably making it discrimination because of sex) or
whether the employer discriminated against the transsexual plaintiff because of some
other reason, such as disruption of the workforce.80 In the usual case, the real
discrimination lies in the inconsistent perceptions between the employer, society, and
the transsexual employee.81 Most employers view MTF transsexuals as men, while
the MTF transsexual views herself as a woman, even if no sexual reassignment
surgery has been undertaken.82 Generally, employers find this difference in
perception of the employee’s sex to be troubling, not the employee’s sex per se.83
The difference in perception is troubling because it may disrupt the workforce by
interfering with workplace homogeneity.84 Employment discrimination law focuses
on the subjective intent of the employer.85 Employers may not discriminate “because
of sex.”86 But Title VII does not prohibit discrimination because of incompatible
perceptions that may cause a disruption in the workforce.87 This means that absent
any direct evidence of discrimination because of sex (e.g., a statement by the
employer that the plaintiff was fired because he was a man who wanted to become a
woman), the transsexual plaintiff would find it very difficult to prove a case under
Title VII’s burden shifting approach.88
On the other hand, through a broad prohibition against discrimination because of
“gender identity or expression,” legislation could address the fine distinction
between discrimination because of transsexualism and discrimination because of
incompatible perceptions, so that an employer could no longer hide behind the
79
See Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1977) (Goodwin,
J., dissenting).
80

Id. (“[The plaintiff] says she was fired for having become female under controversial
circumstances. The employer says these circumstances are disconcerting to other employees .
. . Plaintiff says that how she became female is not her employer’s business . . . . Those are
questions [for a trier of fact].”).
81

See Holloway, 566 F.2d at 661 n.1 (noting that the typical controversy over
transsexualism stems from a difference in perception between society’s view of the
transsexual’s sex and the transsexual’s own view of his or her sex).
82

See generally Holloway, 566 F.2d at 661 n.1.

83

See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.

84

See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.

85

See Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 571 (3rd Cir. 2002)
(“‘Discriminat[ion]’ refers to the practice of making a decision based on a certain criterion,
and therefore focuses on the decisionmaker’s subjective intent.”) (brackets in original).
86

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).

87

See, e.g., Holloway, 566 F.2d at 661-64; Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215,
1219 (10th Cir. 2007); Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 996, 998 (N.D. Ohio
2003).
88

See, e.g., Holloway, 566 F.2d at 661-64; Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1219; Johnson, 337 F.
Supp. 2d at 998.
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argument that the employee was not fired because of transsexualism, but rather
because of the effect or potential effect that the employee’s transsexualism may have
on the workforce. Legislation could also extend protection to other transgendered
people, not just transsexuals. Therefore, it would be better for Congress to enact
legislation specifically protecting transsexuals and other transgendered people from
employment discrimination because such legislation would be broader and more
inclusive than judicial protection under Title VII.
In addition, the legislature is better suited than the court to make important policy
decisions that are peculiar to protection of transsexuals from employment
discrimination. For instance, who is a “transsexual”? Courts that protect
transsexuals under Title VII view transsexualism as a question of fact,89 meaning that
plaintiffs often must pay for medical evidence and expert testimony about the
plaintiff’s transsexualism in order to state a claim.90 If Congress were to provide a
definition of the term, or better yet, if Congress were merely to prohibit
discrimination on the basis of “gender identity or expression,” then, presumably,
plaintiffs would not be chilled from bringing suit because of overly burdensome
evidentiary requirements.91 In addition, such legislation may help to prevent
transvestites and other transgendered people from attempting to pigeon-hole their
way into the category of “transsexual” so that they may bring suit under Title VII
according to case law that currently protects transsexuals but not other transgendered
people.
Moreover, legislation is the most appropriate way to address the issue of
employer health insurance coverage for sexual reassignment surgery. If Title VII
protects transsexuals, then would it be discrimination because of sex for an employer
to refuse to cover sex reassignment surgery or hormone therapy under its insurance
plan?92 Would it matter whether the employer’s insurance covers procedures such as
mastectomies and hormone therapy for non-transsexual employees where those
procedures are medically necessary?93 If Title VII protects transsexuals, then these
are issues that will inevitably have to be litigated, potentially resulting in different
outcomes in different jurisdictions. These collateral issues are matters of policy that
Congress is well suited to decide. This is just one more reason why it is more
appropriate to protect transsexuals through legislative means.
Before moving on to the next section, it is important to address whether
protecting transsexuals from employment discrimination will accomplish the goal of

89

See, e.g., Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 211-212 (D.D.C. 2006).

90

See Vade, supra note 21, at 271-273.

91

See id.

92

In Davidson v. Aetna Life & Casualty Insurance Co., 420 N.Y.S.2d 450, 453 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1979), the court held that sex reassignment surgery for transsexuals is a medically
necessary procedure, and the court refused to exclude the procedure from coverage under the
employer’s health insurance plan.
93
See Mario v. P & C Food Mkts., Inc., 313 F.3d 758, 767 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that the
transsexual employee’s claim under Title VII failed where the employer denied medical
insurance coverage of procedures involving the employee’s treatment of gender dysphoria
where the employee presented no evidence that the insurance plan covered procedures such as
mastectomies for non-transsexual employees).
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providing equal employment opportunities to transsexuals. Scholars writing on this
topic tend to overlook “big picture” questions such as this. But the question merits
serious consideration. Anytime judges or lawmakers contemplate expanding the law
into previously uncharted waters, it is important to consider whether a change in the
law will actually serve to change behavior.
Unfortunately, there is scant empirical data from the United States that addresses
the effectiveness of laws that protect transsexuals from employment discrimination.
This is likely because transsexualism is rare,94 and it is difficult to compile
statistically significant data when the sample size is so small. However, one study
from England revealed some rather disappointing results.95 The study concluded that
“despite the recent legislation regarding transsexual people in employment,
employers are either failing to prevent inequality and discrimination for trans
employees, or [transsexuals] lack faith in their employer’s ability to . . . comply with
employment protection legislation.”96 Nevertheless, transsexuals should be afforded
protection from employment discrimination. Change does not happen overnight; it
was roughly one hundred years after the slaves were freed before the Supreme Court
finally banned racial segregation. The author remains optimistic that federal
protection of transsexuals from employment discrimination will one day achieve its
goal of providing equal employment opportunities.
V. DOING AWAY WITH THE CONGRESSIONAL INTENT APPROACH IN ANALYZING
WHETHER TITLE VII PROTECTS TRANSSEXUALS
Before the Supreme Court’s holding in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,97 federal
appellate courts unanimously held that Title VII did not protect transsexuals from
discrimination because of transsexualism. In a series of opinions in the late 1970s
and early 1980s, the Seventh,98 Eighth,99 and Ninth100 Circuits all held that when
enacting Title VII, Congress intended only to protect women who were
discriminated against because they were women and men who were discriminated
against because they were men; nothing more.101 This part details these three
opinions and concludes that the “congressional intent” approach to analyzing the
issue of whether Title VII protects transsexuals is inappropriate, particularly in light
of the utter lack of legislative history to support the conclusion that Congress did not
intend for Title VII to protect transsexuals from employment discrimination.102

94

WebMD, supra note 7.

95

See WHITTLE, TURNER & AL-ALAMI, supra note 10, at 33-40.

96

Id. at 33.

97

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights
Act of 1991 § 107, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
98

Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984).

99

Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).

100

Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662-63 (9th Cir. 1977).

101

Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1084; Sommers, 667 F.2d at 750; Holloway, 566 F.2d at 663-63.

102

See Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085.
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A. Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co.
In 1977, the Ninth Circuit became the first federal court of appeals to decide
whether Title VII protects transsexuals from employment discrimination. In
Holloway, the MTF plaintiff’s employment was terminated shortly after she
informed her supervisor that she was undergoing treatment in preparation for sex
reassignment surgery.103 The plaintiff claimed that “she was fired for having become
female under controversial circumstances,” in violation of Title VII.104 The district
court dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.105 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed.106 With little explanation or reasoning, the court concluded
that when enacting Title VII, “Congress had only the traditional notions of ‘sex’ in
mind.”107 The court also noted that despite the “dearth” of legislative history
surrounding the original enactment of Title VII, the legislative history surrounding
subsequent amendments to the act evinced a congressional intent “to remedy the
economic deprivation of women as a class.”108 In a desperate attempt to further
support its conclusion, the court noted that subsequent attempts by Congress to
amend Title VII to prohibit discrimination because of “sexual preference” had
failed.109 The court failed to explain how the subsequent amendments and attempted
amendments were relevant to determining Congress’s intent in 1964, when Title VII
was originally enacted.
Judge Goodwin, in his dissent, made the following persuasive comments:
It seems to me irrelevant under Title VII whether the plaintiff was born
female or was born ambiguous and chose to become female. The relevant
fact is that she was, on the day she was fired, a purported female. She
says she was fired for having become female under controversial
circumstances. The employer says these circumstances are disconcerting
to other employees. That may or may not be true. Plaintiff says that how
she became female is not her employer’s business. That may or may not
be true. Those are questions that ought to be answered in court, in a trial;
they should not be precluded by summary judgment or Rule 12
dismissal.110
As is always the case, where the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to cast
doubt upon any legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons that the employer may have
advanced for an adverse employment action, discrimination is a question of fact for
the trier of fact to decide.111 The only logical way to preclude a case with facts such
103

Holloway, 566 F.2d at 661.

104

See id. at 664 (Goodwin, J., dissenting).

105

Id. at 661 (majority opinion).

106

Id.

107

Id. at 662.

108

Id.

109

See id.

110

Id. at 664 (Goodwin, J., dissenting).

111

See id. (majority opinion).
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as Halloway from going to trial would be to conclude that Congress intended to
exclude transsexuals from protection under Title VII. However, there simply is no
factual support for such a conclusion.
B. Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc.
In 1982, the Eighth Circuit became the second federal appellate court to decide
whether Title VII protects transsexuals.112 In Sommers, the pre-operative MTF
transsexual plaintiff was fired from her job two days after being hired “because she
misrepresented herself as an anatomical female when she applied for the job,” and
such “misrepresentation led to a disruption of the company’s work routine in that a
number of female employees indicated they would quit if Sommers were permitted
to use the restroom facilities assigned to female personnel.”113 The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the plaintiff’s claim.114 On
appeal, the court affirmed.115 The Eighth Circuit concluded that “[b]ecause Congress
has not shown an intention to protect transsexuals, we hold that discrimination based
on one’s transsexualism does not fall within the protective purview of [Title VII].”116
The court in Sommers also noted the congressional attempts and failures to amend
Title VII to prohibit discrimination because of “sexual preference.”117 Confusingly,
the court noted that, “Sommers’s claim is not one dealing with discrimination on the
basis of sexual preference,” but then went on to say, “[n]evertheless, the fact that the
proposals were defeated indicates that the word ‘sex’ in Title VII is to be given its
traditional definition, rather than an expansive interpretation.”118 As in Holloway,
the Eighth Circuit attempted to determine Congress’s intent in 1964 by interpreting
subsequent congressional actions regarding a different protected class.119
C. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines (Ulane II)
Until recently, the leading case in the realm of Title VII protection for
transsexuals was the Seventh Circuit’s 1984 opinion in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines
(Ulane II). In Ulane I, the district court held that “the statutory word ‘sex’ literally
and scientifically applies to transsexuals even if it does not apply to homosexuals or
transvestites.”120 Ulane I ordered reinstatement, back pay, and attorney’s fees to the
MTF transsexual plaintiff.121 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit, in Ulane II, held that
Title VII does not protect transsexuals because “Congress never considered nor

112

See Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).

113

Id. at 748-49.

114

Id. at 749.

115

Id. at 750.

116

Id.

117

See id.

118

Id.

119

See id.

120

Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984).

121

Id. at 1082.
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intended that [Title VII] apply to anything other than the traditional concept of
sex.”122 Ulane II was in accord with the two other federal courts of appeals that had
decided the issue at the time: the Ninth Circuit;123 and the Eighth Circuit.124
Ulane II’s reasoning is hardly persuasive. Ulane II starts with the premise that
the court must “interpret this congressional legislation and determine what Congress
intended when it decided to outlaw discrimination based on sex.”125 Next, the court
notes that “‘[s]ex as a basis of discrimination was added as a floor amendment one
day before the House approved Title VII, without prior hearing or debate.’”126 From
this “total lack of legislative history supporting the sex amendment,”127 the court
somehow concludes that Congress intended to exclude transsexuals from protection
under Title VII.128
Holloway, Sommers, and Ulane II represent the problem with using a
congressional intent approach to analyze whether Title VII protects transsexuals: the
court must create something out of nothing. The sex amendment was originally
proposed in order to defeat Title VII from passing in the House vote.129 That is it—
the only reason why Title VII now prohibits discrimination because of sex is because
a Congressman hoped that by adding “sex” as a protected class, the legislation would
fail. But, obviously, the statute passed with the term “sex” included. So, what did
Congress mean by “sex” when it passed the statute? Ulane II concludes from “the
circumstances of the amendment’s adoption” a “clear[] indicat[ion]” that Congress
did not intend to protect transsexuals.130 But the “circumstances of the amendment’s
adoption” are anything but “clear.” If anything, the addition of the word “sex”
shows that Congress in 1964 was willing to prohibit a broader range of
discrimination than some of the individual Congressmen believed Congress would
be willing to prohibit at the time.
Other jurists argue that Congress’s explicit exclusion of transsexuals from
protection under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act is
evidence that Congress did not intend Title VII to protect transsexuals from
employment discrimination.131 One law review note even opined that the fact that
“Congress lumped transsexuality with pedophilia, exhibitionism, and voyeurism in
both disability acts” is “strong evidence that Congress was unsympathetic, and even
hostile, to the plight of transsexuals.”132 However, even assuming, arguendo, that
122

Id. at 1085.

123

See Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662-63 (9th Cir. 1977).

124

See Sommers, 667 F.2d at 750.

125

Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1084.

126

Id. at 1085 (quoting Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662).

127

Id.

128

See id.

129

See id.

130

Id.

131

See, e.g., James G. O’Keefe, Note, Pyrrhic Victory: Smith v. City of Salem and the
Title VII Rights of Transsexuals, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 1101, 1119 (2007).
132

Id.
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Congress was hostile to the plight of transsexuals when the Rehabilitation Act and
the Americans with Disabilities Act were enacted, this bears little, if any, relevance
on what Congress intended in 1964 when it enacted Title VII.133 Moreover, express
exclusion of protection of transsexuals from employment discrimination in
subsequent Acts of Congress evinces the exact opposite: that Title VII protects
transsexuals. Express exclusion from coverage under the disability statutes shows
that Congress knew how to write legislation so that it would not be interpreted to
protect classes of people that Congress did not intend to protect. Therefore,
Congress’s express exclusion of transsexuals in subsequent Acts, along with its
failure to expressly exclude transsexuals from protection under Title VII, only
supports the conclusion that transsexuals are protected by Title VII.134
It is sometimes difficult to know exactly what one person means when he or she
speaks, let alone an entire Congress. This is not to say that congressional intent is
never relevant or even that congressional intent is not a compelling tool to use in
statutory interpretation. However, where, as here, there is literally no legislative
history to assist courts in their interpretation of the word “sex,” one cannot condone a
court purporting to “interpret” Title VII by looking to congressional intent, when in
fact what the court is doing is making assumptions about what Congress intended,
with absolutely no factual or evidentiary basis.135
Moreover, even if Congress did not contemplate that the phrase “because of sex”
may be interpreted to include “because of transsexualism,” “Supreme Court
decisions subsequent to Ulane . . . have applied Title VII in ways Congress could not
have contemplated.”136 In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,137 Justice
Scalia noted, “[S]tatutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil [that
statutes are enacted to combat] to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is
ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our

133

See, e.g., Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228, 236 (1959) (noting that the intent of a later
Congress in deciding when to declare an end to a war is not relevant in determining the intent
of an earlier Congress in using the phrase “in time of peace”); See also In re Mfrs’ Nat’l Bank,
16 F. Cas. 665, 668 (N.D. Ill. 1873) (No. 9051) (stating the rule of statutory construction that
terms of a subsequent statute that do not expressly contradict the terms of a previous statute
shall not be interpreted as intended to affect the terms of the previous statute).
134

See generally Fernandez-Vargas v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 881, 886 (10th Cir. 2005)
(noting that express exemptions of certain groups of people in subsequent statutory provisions
showed that “when Congress intended to exempt certain groups of [people] from the sweep of
the . . . statute, it knew how to do so,” and concluding that Congress’s failure to expressly
exempt the group to which the plaintiff belonged showed that the plaintiff was not exempt).
135
I believe that, in all likelihood, Congress did not intend for Title VII to protect
transsexuals. It just does not make sense. Why would a politician care about a group of
people that is politically powerless because they comprise such a small percentage of the
population? However, there is a discrete danger in basing decisions on mere speculation and
probabilities. The danger is that speculation may lead to both an inaccurate and unjust result.
If the law is about justice, then speculation with no evidentiary or factual support is untenable.
136

Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 212 (D.D.C. 2006).

137

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
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legislators by which we are governed.”138 Therefore, courts should not look to
congressional intent in analyzing whether Title VII protects transsexuals.
VI. THE SEX STEREOTYPING THEORY IS AN INAPPROPRIATE METHOD OF
DETERMINING WHETHER TITLE VII PROTECTS TRANSSEXUALS
The recent trend in the federal appellate courts is to hold that Title VII protects
transsexuals from employment discrimination under the “sex stereotyping” theory
espoused in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.139 In fact, all three circuit courts to decide
the issue after Price Waterhouse have either expressly held, or stated in dicta, that
Title VII protects transsexuals under a sex stereotyping theory.140 The only circuit
court to expressly hold that transsexuals are protected from employment
discrimination under a sex stereotyping theory is the Sixth Circuit.141 The Eighth and
Ninth Circuits have stated in dicta that Title VII protects transsexuals under a sex
stereotyping theory.142 This part will discuss the sex stereotyping theory of Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins and the cases using this theory as a basis for holding that
Title VII protects transsexuals. The author concludes that the sex stereotyping
theory, although perhaps applicable to how a transsexual plaintiff may prove
causation in an employment discrimination case under Title VII, is not applicable to
the threshold question of whether transsexuals are members of a protected class.
A. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
In the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, a
majority of the Court agreed that a woman who was denied a promotion, in part
because she was considered too “macho,”143 was discriminated against “because of
sex.”144 Ms. Hopkins was a senior manager in a large accounting firm.145 She was
ultimately denied partnership for many reasons, but some of the partners decided to
vote against offering Ms. Hopkins partnership because she needed to “‘walk more
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her
hair styled, and wear jewelry.’”146 Although the main issues in the case related to

138

Id. at 79.

139

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights
Act of 1991 § 107, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
140

See, e.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Etsitty v.
Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir. 2007); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d
1187, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2000).
141

See Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 737 (6th Cir. 2005); Smith, 378 F.3d at

575.
142

See sources supra note 140.

143

Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235.

144

See id. at 250-51 (four Justice plurality opinion); id. at 259 (White, J., concurring); id.
at 272-73 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
145

Id. at 231.

146

Id. at 235 (quoting Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (D.D.C.

1985)).
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causation147 and the burden of proof in a mixed-motives case148 under Title VII, there
was also an issue of whether discrimination because of a failure to conform to gender
stereotypes constituted discrimination “because of sex.”149 As to this latter issue, the
Court stressed that “we are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate
employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with
their group.”150 Therefore, an employee is discriminated against “because of sex”
where the employer makes an adverse employment decision because of that
employee’s failure to act in a manner consistent with the employee’s sex.151
B. Schwenk v. Hartford
Schwenk was the first case to apply the Price Waterhouse sex stereotyping theory
in the context of transsexuals.152 Schwenk involved an MTF transsexual’s claim
against a prison guard under the Gender Motivated Violence Act (GMVA).153 The
Ninth Circuit read the relevant provisions of the GMVA as being analogous with
Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination because of sex.154 The court then went
on to say that
The initial judicial approach taken in cases such as Holloway has been
overruled by the logic and language of Price Waterhouse. In Price
Waterhouse . . . the Supreme Court held that Title VII barred not just
discrimination based on the fact that Hopkins was a woman, but also
discrimination based on the fact that she failed “to act like a woman”—
that is, to conform to socially-constructed gender expectations. What
matters, for purposes of this part of the Price Waterhouse analysis, is that
in the mind of the perpetrator the discrimination is related to the sex of the
victim: here, for example, the perpetrator’s actions stem from the fact that
he believed that the victim was a man who “failed to act like” one. Thus,
under Price Waterhouse, “sex” under Title VII encompasses both sex—
that is, the biological differences between men and women—and gender.
Discrimination because one fails to act in the way expected of a man or
woman is forbidden under Title VII. . . . [B]oth [Title VII and the GMVA]
prohibit discrimination based on gender as well as sex. Indeed, for

147

See id. at 240-42.

148

See id. at 245-46.

149

See id. at 250-51 (noting that the parties did not overtly dispute whether discrimination
because of non-conformity with stereotypes of a particular sex constitutes discrimination
“because of sex,” but discussing the issue regardless).
150

Id. at 251.

151

Id.

152

Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000).

153

See id. at 1192; see also 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b) (2006) declared unconstitutional by
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
154

Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1201-02.
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purposes of these two acts, the terms “sex” and “gender” have become
interchangeable.155
Schwenk ultimately held that the plaintiff’s claim under the GMVA failed;156
however, the dicta quoted above opened the door for other federal district and
appellate courts to hold that Title VII protects transsexuals from employment
discrimination.157
C. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority
In Etsitty, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to an employer who terminated an MTF transsexual employee for
expressing an intention to use women’s restrooms before formally undergoing a sex
change operation.158 This was certainly a peculiar disposition considering the fact
that the employer had no evidence that the plaintiff had ever actually used a
women’s restroom while at work.159 The court, however, held that firing an MTF
transsexual employee for merely expressing an intention to use a women’s restroom
while working constituted a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action.160 In its analysis of whether Title VII protects transsexuals in
the first instance, the court expressly rejected161 the plaintiff’s argument that
“because a person’s identity as a transsexual is directly connected to the sex organs
she possesses, discrimination on this basis must constitute discrimination because of
sex.”162 However, the court “assume[d], without deciding” that Title VII protects
transsexuals under a sex stereotyping theory.163
D. Smith v. City of Salem
In Smith, the Sixth Circuit became the first, and thus far, the only, federal circuit
court to expressly hold that Title VII protects transsexuals under a sex stereotyping
theory.164 Relying on Schwenk and Price Waterhouse, the Sixth Circuit held that the
transsexual plaintiff had stated a claim for relief under Title VII.165 Smith reasoned
that “[s]ex stereotyping based on a person’s gender non-conforming behavior is
impermissible discrimination, irrespective of the cause of that behavior; a label such
as ‘transsexual,’ is not fatal to a sex discrimination claim where the victim has
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suffered discrimination because of his or her gender non-conformity.”166 The
plaintiff in Smith was an MTF transsexual whose employer suspended her shortly
after she informed her supervisor of her diagnosis with, and treatment for, Gender
Identity Disorder.167 Notably, the court in Smith operated on the premise that
transsexuals are, in fact, of the sex that they were assigned at birth.168 From this
premise, it becomes rather obvious that a transsexual is the epitome of somebody
who does not conform to the stereotypes associated with the group to which doctors
assigned that individual upon birth.169 Therefore, discrimination against transsexuals
is an easily recognizable form of sex stereotyping that constitutes impermissible
discrimination under Title VII.170
This all makes perfect sense if, and only if, one accepts the court’s premise that
transsexuals are of the sex that they were assigned at birth. This premise is arguably
factually inaccurate,171 but more importantly, it is bad policy to regard transsexuals
as members of the sex to which they were assigned at birth.172 As to the factual
inaccuracy of this premise, “Medical literature recognizes that: Gender Identity
Disorder . . . is not meant to describe a child’s nonconformity to stereotypic sex-role
behavior as, for example, in ‘tomboyishness’ in girls or ‘sissyish’ behavior in boys.
Rather, it represents a profound disturbance of the individual’s sense of identity with
regard to maleness or femaleness.”173 In addition, transsexuals do conform to gender
stereotypes;174 in fact, as part of the treatment for transsexualism, they are required to
conform to gender stereotypes.175 In Price Waterhouse, the plaintiff was a woman
who identified as a woman, but whose behavior resembled that of a man.176 In the
case of an MTF transsexual, you have a woman who identifies and acts like a
woman,177 but whose body parts resemble those of a man.
There are two policy problems with operating from the premise that transsexuals
belong to the sex to which they were assigned at birth. First, this sort of
conceptualization feeds right into the mindset of a transphobic. Remember that
transphobia stems from a belief that transsexuals are deceptive and cannot be trusted
166
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because they do not identify with the doctor-declared “truth” that is their sex
assigned at birth.178 Therefore, a court giving credence to this doctor-declared
“truth” engages in a subtle form of communication, which allows transphobic people
to carry on in their bigotry.
Second, saying that transsexuals belong to the sex to which they were assigned at
birth requires plaintiffs in a Title VII claim to plead, and admit that they belong to,
that sex, even though they do not themselves believe that they belong to that sex.
Such a pleading requirement may create collateral consequences for the transsexual
plaintiff that the Sixth Circuit probably did not have in mind when it held that Title
VII protects transsexuals under a sex stereotyping theory. For example, say a preoperative MTF transsexual in Ohio is fired and files a suit under Title VII.
According to Smith, the plaintiff must plead that she is a man, and that she was
discriminated against for failing to conform to stereotypical masculine behavior.179
Later in life, after the same person has undergone sexual reassignment surgery, she
falls in love and seeks to marry to a man. But wait! There is public record where the
same woman who now seeks to marry a man admitted that she was, indeed, a man.
Will the marriage be valid?180 When the husband dies, will the wife be able to share
in his estate?181 All of these potential collateral issues could be avoided if courts give
credence to the plaintiff’s self-identified sex, rather than the doctor-assigned sex.
Before moving on, the author would like to clear up any potential confusion in
this discussion. It is quite conceivable, maybe even likely, that an employer would
view an MTF transsexual employee as a man, and then take an adverse employment
action against that employee for failing to conform with the employer’s stereotypes
about how men should act. Since the employer’s subjective intent in deciding
whether to make an adverse employment decision is what matters,182 it may seem
difficult to understand how the sex stereotyping theory would not apply. However,
as a threshold matter, the plaintiff in a Title VII case must prove that he or she is a
member of a protected class.183 It is in this context that the author argues that the sex
stereotyping theory from Price Waterhouse should not apply. An MTF transsexual
plaintiff is a member of a protected class because she is a woman, despite what
doctors, employers, and everybody else in society may think. Even if one chooses to
classify an MTF transsexual as a man, that individual would still be a member of a
protected class under Title VII because Title VII protects everybody.184 If the
employer fires her (the MTF plaintiff) for failing to be “manly,” then presumably,
the sex stereotyping rule would enter its way into the analysis of whether the
employer’s reason for making the adverse employment decision gives rise to liability
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under Title VII.185 If the termination is, instead, for failure to look like a woman or
for failure to be born with female genetalia, then presumably, there would still be
discrimination “because of sex,” but the sex stereotyping rule would not apply in
such cases. The sex stereotyping rule is nothing more then one of the many ways in
which a plaintiff can show that he or she was discriminated against “because of sex.”
Price Waterhouse was not a case where Ms. Hopkin’s status as a member of a
protected class was at issue.186 Yet, circuit courts often misapply the “logic and
language” of Price Waterhouse in analyzing whether a transsexual plaintiff who
brings a claim under Title VII is a member of a protected class.187 This
misapplication of the sex stereotyping theory likely results from the history of the
case law interpreting Title VII, which initially held that transsexuals are not members
of a protected class because Congress did not intend to protect transsexuals when
enacting Title VII.188 Indeed, it makes more sense to analyze Title VII protection of
transsexuals under the “protected class” prong of the plaintiff’s prima facie case if
using a congressional intent approach. However, under a sex stereotyping approach,
one must first assume that transsexuals are members of a protected class because the
sex stereotyping rule only applies in analyzing whether the employer’s reason(s) for
taking an adverse employment action constitute(s) discrimination “because of
sex.”189 Price Waterhouse relates to proof of causation and has nothing to do with
the separate issue of whether the plaintiff is a member of a protected class.190
VII. COURTS SHOULD ANALYZE WHETHER TITLE VII PROTECTS TRANSSEXUALS BY
LOOKING TO THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE STATUTE
Statutory analysis both begins and ends with the plain meaning of the words that
the Legislature has chosen to employ.191 In the context of Title VII, the statute
prohibits discrimination in the “compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of
employment, because of . . . sex.”192 As noted before, given the total lack of
legislative history regarding the meaning of the word “sex,”193 courts are left with
nothing to analyze but the plain meaning of this seemingly simple and
straightforward word. Using such a plain meaning approach, courts have come to
opposite conclusions as to whether “sex” also includes a “sex change.” This part
will discuss three cases in which the court used a plain meaning approach to
determine whether Title VII protects transsexuals, and concludes that the word “sex”
185
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should be construed liberally to include discrimination against transsexuals because
they are transsexuals.
A. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines (Ulane I)
In Ulane I, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
held “that the term, ‘sex,’ as used in any scientific sense and as used in [Title VII]
can be and should be reasonably interpreted to include among its denotations the
question of sexual identity and that, therefore, transsexuals are protected by Title
VII.”194 The court explicitly refused to make any assumptions about what Congress
intended when using the word “sex,” or to draw any conclusions from the scant
legislative history on the addition of the word “sex” to the statute.195 The court’s
reasoning was simple and straightforward; the MTF transsexual plaintiff was
terminated from her employment because she had an operation whereby her male
genitalia were medically converted into female genitalia,196 and termination for such
a reason was “literally” discrimination because of sex.197
B. Schroer v. Billington
In Schroer, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia revisited
the decision in Ulane I and held that “discrimination against transsexuals because
they are transsexuals is ‘literally’ discrimination ‘because of . . . sex.’”198 The court
distinguished the line of cases applying the sex stereotyping theory from Price
Waterhouse by noting that
Schroer is not seeking acceptance as a man with feminine traits. She
seeks to express her female identity, not as an effeminate male, but as a
woman. She does not wish to go against the gender grain, but with it.
She has embraced the cultural mores dictating that “Diane” is a female
name and that women wear feminine attire. The problem she faces is not
because she does not conform to the Library’s stereotypes about how men
and women should look and behave—she adopts those norms. Rather, her
problems stem from the Library’s intolerance toward a person like her,
whose gender identity does not match her anatomical sex.199
Schroer is the only case to date which scratches beneath the surface of the post Price
Waterhouse case law interpreting Title VII to come to the right conclusion.
Moreover, Schroer is the only case to embrace the self-identification notion of sex
and to operate from the premise that transsexuals belong to the sex with which they
identify themselves.
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C. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority
In Etsitty, the plaintiff made two arguments in support of the finding that
transsexuals were members of a protected class: the first argument was that the plain
meaning of the statute protects transsexuals as transsexuals,200 and the second
argument was that Title VII protects transsexuals under a sex stereotyping theory.201
As to the first argument, the court held that Title VII “protection extends to
transsexual employees only if they are discriminated against because they are male
or because they are female.”202 In so holding, the court noted that “[s]cientific
research may someday cause a shift in the plain meaning of the term ‘sex’ so that it
extends beyond the two starkly defined categories of male and female.”203 Apart
from the fact that there is scientific research recognizing that sex extends beyond the
male-female binary,204 to the author fails to understand how or why science could
change the “plain meaning” of the word “sex.” Moreover, as has been previously
stated, if courts give credence to the transsexual’s self-identification of his or her sex,
then the issue will never be whether a transsexual plaintiff is a member of a protected
class (since transsexuals identify themselves as either being male or female), but
rather whether the employer terminated the plaintiff “because of sex.”
This is not to say that the Etsitty approach is illogical. To the contrary, it makes
sense to narrowly interpret “discrimination because of sex” as meaning
discrimination against men because they are men or women because they are
women. However, it also makes sense to broadly interpret “discrimination because
of sex” as meaning discrimination against men because they are perceived as being
women or discrimination against women because they are perceived as being men.
Many courts have said that “Title VII is a remedial statute which should be liberally
construed.”205 Therefore, there is no reason to interpret the word “sex” narrowly
absent any indication that Congress intended otherwise when enacting the statute.
VIII. CONCLUSION
If employment discrimination law is intended to protect people from
discrimination based on immutable characteristics, then the law ought to protect
transsexuals. The best way to protect transsexuals from employment discrimination
is through legislative means. Legislation can protect a broad range of transgendered
people, and the Legislature is better equipped than courts to resolve all the policy
issues that may arise by granting transsexuals protection from employment
discrimination.
However, Title VII should also be interpreted as protecting transsexuals. In the
end, law is nothing more and nothing less than the government’s attempt to create
rules and policies intended to curb behavior and realize justice through the use of
words. These words must be given their plain meaning unless otherwise defined.
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Where, as in the case of Title VII, there is a statute that was intended to be construed
liberally, and there is literally no legislative history from which one could conclude
what Congress intended by using the word “sex,” there is no reason not to hold that
Title VII protects transsexuals as transsexuals. The sex stereotyping theory from
Price Waterhouse, although presumably applicable to the element of causation in the
case of a transsexual plaintiff, should not be applied to determine whether
transsexuals are members of a protected class. Rather, courts should operate on the
premise that transsexuals are of the sex that they believe themselves to be, and then
seek to determine whether they have been discriminated against because of sex.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss3/9

26

